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This series of policy briefs provides a regular update of debates concerning key rights issues in 
three Arab states, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. In a first round of briefs on the three countries, 
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Egypt’s possible transition to democracy has recently witnessed its most critical moment since the 
revolution of 25
th
 January 2011. The ousting of President Mohammad Morsi in July 2013 
jeopardised the democratic aspirations of many liberals, despite their joining the protest against the 
rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. On the contrary, political and civil rights have suffered a severe 
downturn and the prospect of establishing democratic institutions has become more distant.  
 
The 2014 constitution contains some improvement in the protection of rights compared to the 2012 
constitution written by Islamists. But the implementation of these positive aspects remains 
uncertain. The changing structure of political power and alliances in the post-Muslim Brotherhood 
period has led to a dramatic worsening of civil and political rights. The military and other 
conservative political forces, including remnants of the Mubarak regime, have been significantly 
empowered after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian paradox is that a majority of 
Egyptians look to the military and its leaders as the country’s only possible saviour, despite 
increasing frustration over the regime's democratic credentials. Meanwhile, liberal revolutionary 
forces are undergoing a protracted crisis, suffering from internal divisions and coercive repression. 




While the new constitution gained overwhelming support in the January 2014 referendum, its 
capacity to heal Egypt’s political polarisation is questionable. The constitution was drafted and 
adopted through an exclusionary political process. While the newly appointed Constituent 
Assembly was drafting the document, the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, youth revolutionary 
forces and human rights defenders were being subjected to harsh repression and stigmatisation. The 
referendum demonstrated the limited space currently available for opponents. The ‘No’ vote 
campaign struggled to gain access to the state or private media. Moreover, opponents, belonging 
mainly to the Muslim Brotherhood, were arrested and convicted for campaigning against the vote.  
 
With respect to citizenship rights, the 2014 constitution deals with many of the shortcomings of its 
2012 predecessor. However, it contains certain limitations that dilute any improvement. The 
contradictory content of the new constitution reflects the ideological and political climate that 
preceded the work of the Constituent Assembly. Most importantly, the influence of the military in 
the constitution-making process is reflected in the significant status it enjoys under the new 
constitution. According to its provisions, for the next two presidential mandates the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) should approve the appointment of the minister of defence, a step 
that places the military above other elected bodies (Article 234). The impact of this is compounded 
by the fact that the defence minister will be the Commander-in-Chief, rather than the President 
(Article 201). The military courts are mandated to try civilians if they commit certain vaguely 
defined offences against the armed forces (Article 204). Moreover, the military budget remains 
beyond proper scrutiny from civilian elected bodies, keeping the army's prerogatives untouched.  
 
The principles of Islamic law continue to be the main source of legislation and the Supreme 
Constitutional Court becomes the interpreting authority of these principles. The official Islamic 
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establishment, al–Azhar’s advisory role in the law-making process was removed but Article 7 of the 
Constitution determines that al-Azhar is the principal reference for religious sciences and Islamic 
affairs. This article leaves the door open for al-Azhar to determine the content of Islamic law. Some 
secularist intellectuals, the liberal Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the leftist al-Tajamu‘ Party 
hoped that the new constitution would include safeguards for the separation of the state and 
religion.
1
  This was not possible within the new political landscape given the need to compromise 
with the Salafist al-Nour Party. Al-Azhar’s political role was consolidated to counter the influence 
of Islamists. The Constitution risks creating a divide between an official, institutionalised Islam and 
several different Islams, supported by Salafis and Imams. 
 
The provision on blasphemy was removed and the status of women is improved by explicitly stating 
that ‘the state guarantees equality between men and women in political, social, cultural and 
economic spheres’ (Article 11). The constitution also provides for affirmative action to encourage 
women’s political participation. It obliges the first elected parliament to pass a law on the 
Construction of Churches, a demand that has been long made by Christians. However, the reference 
to Islamic law could limit the scope of these rights, depending on the tendencies of the 
interpretative authorities. Recent months have witnessed accusations of blasphemy and the 
conviction of members of unrecognised religious minorities such as Shi‘a. Freedom of belief in the 
Constitution is absolute but the establishment of places of worship is limited only to the followers 
of the Abrahamic religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism). The Constitution recognises the rights 
of non-Muslims to apply their own religious regulations to govern their family and religious affairs 
(Article 3), something rare in other Sunni-majority states in the region. This acknowledgement 
entrenches the sectarian regulation of personal status matters in Egypt, rather than establishing one 
civil legal system for all its citizens. The application of sectarian family laws is controversial; while, 
on the one hand, members of each religious community will be able to follow their own religious 
laws, on the other these regulations could be at odds with   internationally recognised human rights.  
 
Criminal defamation laws remain but the constitution abolishes prison sentences for publication 
offences except for incitement to violence and defaming individual honour. The publication of 
newspapers is guaranteed where authorities are notified. However, the regulation of private TV 
channels and radio stations is left to future regulations. The same regulations might also be adopted 
for on-line media. The constitution stipulates that the state should ensure the independence and 
multiplicity of views in state-owned media. However, it is ambivalent on the powers and 
impartiality of the media regulatory bodies, leaving the door open for restrictions on broadcast 
media.  
 
Citizens have the right to peaceful assembly and to hold public meetings, after notifying the 
authorities. The constitution guarantees freedom of artistic expression and according to Article 67 
says that ‘no legal action can be taken to suspend or confiscate artistic, literary, or intellectual 
works or against the creators thereof except by the Public Prosecution’. This addition was intended 
to block direct criminal and civil lawsuits filed by Islamists against artists (known in Egypt as hisba 
cases). While the constitution improves the protection of freedom of expression it has not fully 
banned censorship on artistic creativity.  
 
The constitution protects the right to freedom of information, freedom to establish political parties, 
NGOs and trade unions. Article 74 says that ‘no political activity may be exercised or political 
parties formed on the basis of religion’. This provision is most likely to be applied in a selective and 
                                                     
1A roundtable organised by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies on 21 September 2013 with the participation 
of representatives of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, al-Tajamu‘ Party, Socialist Popular Alliance Party the as 
well as three members of the Constituent Assembly and a group of human rights NGOs. For a complete list of the 
participants see Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. (2013). Available at: http://www.cihrs.org/?p=7301  
  
      EUSPRING - ARAB CITIZENSHIP REVIEW N. 4 
politicised manner, particularly under a constitution that still accords superior status for Islamic law. 
Former President Hosni Mubarak added a similar provision to the 1971 Constitution in 2007 to 
prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from forming a political party. But the reference to religion is also 
found in the platforms of non-Islamist parties like the former National Democratic Party, the liberal 
al-Wafd Party and others. This article is not expected to harm Islamists aligned with the regime like 
the Salafi al-Nour party but it could be applied to other political parties affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Article 92 of the constitution stipulates that ‘all rights and freedoms are inalienable 
and cannot be suspended. Any laws that regulate the practice of constitutional rights and freedoms 
should not restrict their substance and essence’. According to Article 93, ‘the state should comply 
with ratified human rights treaties, which become domestic laws after their publication’. These 
articles could allow for a liberal interpretation of constitutional rights.     
 
Overall, the contribution of this document to the democratic transition and the protection of rights 
in Egypt is merely symbolic. The military-backed transitional government continues to monopolise 
powers and exclude dissenting forces, the positive provisions in the constitution have not prevented 
the state from encroaching on rights, drawing up legislation in discord with the Constitution, such 
as those allowing the persecution of journalists, civil society, political activists and trade unionists. 
Moreover, the restrictions on establishing trade unions and the right to strike remain in place, 
apparently in contravention of the new Article 15. The current structure of political power does not 
indicate that the new elected executive and legislature will be willing to defend constitutional rights 
through legislation. The judiciary is the only possible forum for implementing the constitution. 
Lawyers and human rights defenders can use the positive constitutional provisions in future 
litigation and advocacy to widen the interpretation of constitutional rights. In February, the 
Misdemeanour Court of Damanhur referred the assembly law to the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(SCC) after the lawyers of a group of workers accused of organising a demonstration without 
permission argued that the law violates the constitutional protection of freedom of assembly.
2
 
Litigation can help widen the political space but its effect is limited without having political forces 
on the ground that can change the balance of power. Egypt's judiciary is not also immune from 
political pressure and its positions on rights are not consistent. The worsening of rights in practice 
and the current deep societal divides overshadow any improvement in the new Constitution.     
 
Since the ouster of Morsi, the military-backed government has taken far-reaching measures against 
the Muslim Brotherhood in a clear attempt to paralyse the organisation and its grassroots in Egypt. 
The use of lethal force by the military and security forces to disperse sits-in and protests have led to 
the killing of more than a thousand protesters. Thousands of leaders and members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood have been arrested and prosecuted. Many of these are accused of violence or 
incitement to violence but numerous other cases are based on charges related to the peaceful 
exercise of freedom of expression and assembly.  
 
The shocking recent verdict that sentenced 529 of Morsi’s supporters to death after a sham trial 
casts doubts over due process and fair trial safeguards for defendants. Moreover, the selectivity of 
trials gives an additional sign for the politicisation of the judicial system.
3
 For three years, the 
military and security have been shielded from accountability for atrocities committed before and 
after the 2011 revolution. However, the state and its judiciary have recently been active in providing 
                                                     
2 See al-Shuruq Newspaper. (2014). Available at: 
  http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=10022014&id=3373c661-24a4-480a-bb07-38c7b7f19fbc  
3 See Human Rights Watch. (2014) ‘Egypt: Shocking Death Sentences Follow Sham Trial’. Available at: 
 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/24/egypt-shocking-death-sentences-follow-sham-trial  
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evidence to convict Morsi and his associates for killing protesters during his year in power. Due to 
international pressure, the interim President Adli Mansur formed an official Fact Finding 
Commission to investigate bloody incidents that have occurred since 30 June 2013.
4
 The report of 
this enquiry will be handed only to the president and will not be public. Moreover, based on similar 
experiences with previous official inquiries, there are fears that without strong legal powers, the 
commission will not be able to access official records or obtain information from the security 
agencies. An Egyptian court ordered the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood and all of its 
organisational offshoots and the confiscation of their assets.
5
 On 25 December 2013, the 
government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation based on the anti-terrorism 
provision in the Penal Code, a provision that broadly defines the crime of terrorism. Over the past 
four months, the repression has expanded, targeting secular opposition, youth revolutionary 
coalitions, journalists and human rights defenders.   
 
The stigmatisation of human rights defenders and liberal activists has become common in state and 
private media with direct support from the military and security apparatus. Critical voices now 
rarely appear in Egyptian media. This reflects the political preferences of a small group of 
businessmen who own the private media outlets. A new law was adopted in November 2013, 
placing draconian restrictions on peaceful assemblies and protests. The General Prosecutor and the 
judiciary have systematically used orders of pre-trial detention and travel bans against opponents on 
trumped-up charges.
6
 The Interim President decreed a law to make the pre-trial detention indefinite 
for persons accused of certain crimes, a step that led to the dramatic increase of detainees pending 
trials. The practice of torture and ill treatment of prisoners and detainees has been repeatedly 
reported by human rights observers.  
 
This atmosphere threatens the competitiveness and integrity of the upcoming presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Moreover, the new presidential electoral law triggered controversy by 
shielding the decisions of the Electoral Commission from any judicial oversight, a procedure that 
could open the door to electoral irregularities. State institutions including the military have 
mobilised all sources to sponsor the candidacy of the former minister of defence, Field Marshal el-
Sisi. Other potential candidates from different political backgrounds have cast doubts on the 
credibility of the presidential race.
7
 Without tackling the limitations of this restrictive political and 
legal environment, the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections will not have any impact 
on the democratic transition. This decline of rights highlights the difficulty in overcoming 
polarisation through a purely majoritarian approach to politics in post-2011 Egypt.   
 
 
This dramatic downturn of rights can be explained by the changing structure of political power and 
the shift in political alliances in the post-Morsi era where conservative and counter-revolutionary 
forces have significantly advanced their powers and liberal and revolutionary forces have been 
undercut. The restrictive institutional and legal framework inherited from the Mubarak regime has 
not been reformed by the successive transitional governments; indeed, it has been repeatedly used 
                                                     
4 See Presidential Decree No.689/2013, Official Gazette no.51bis of 21 December 2013.   
5 See a statement by Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. (2013) Available at: 
http://www.eipr.org/pressrelease/2014/01/20/1935  
6 See Human Rights Watch. (2014) ‘Egypt: High Price of Dissent: Journalists, Protesters, Academics Charged over 
Speech Offenses’. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/19/egypt-high-price-dissent  
7 See Al-Jazeera English. (2014) Egypt’s Election Lacks Candidates. Available at:  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/egypt-election-lacks-candidates-20143278132166580.html 
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by them, including by the Muslim Brotherhood, to curtail opponents. Throughout the transition, the 
SCAF has exerted pressure on elected organs to preserve the mandate of military justice to try 
civilians and provide an exclusive jurisdiction to military courts over crimes committed by 
members of the military even if investigation is initiated after their retirement.
8
 President Morsi 
missed the opportunity, as the first elected civilian president, to align with other revolutionary 
forces to engage in security sector reform, judicial reform and to democratise civil-military 
relations.     
 
The proactive role of the military and its leaders in ousting President Morsi and confronting the 
Muslim Brotherhood has significantly upgraded its powers and popularity. The violent 
confrontation with militant Islamists and the popular demand for stability and security have allowed 
the military and security apparatus to enjoy unchecked powers. Other conservative political forces 
equipped with organisational and financial resources, including remnants of Mubarak regime and 
the Salafist al-Nour Party, have advanced their status in the new political regime, benefiting from 
the retreat of the Muslim Brotherhood. This has coincided with strong repressive measures and 
media propaganda against the Muslim Brotherhood and other revolutionary forces, as well as a 
growing fragmentation among the revolutionary liberal and leftist camp. Some liberal and 
revolutionary figures were appointed in key executive posts after the removal of Morsi. For 
instance, the former leader of the liberal the Constitution (al-Dustur) Party Mohamed ElBaradei 
was appointed as Vice President, while Hazem El-Beblawy and Ziad Bahha-Eldin, prominent 
figures in the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, were appointed respectively as Prime Minister and 
Deputy Prime-Minister. Nevertheless, they failed to counter-balance the influence of the military, 
the security apparatus or the conservative forces in the government. The closest figures to 
revolutionary forces, ElBaradei and Bahaa-Edin, resigned from their posts and eventually al-
Beblawy and his cabinet resigned in February 2014. The new cabinet appointed by the Interim-
President is dominated by pro-military and figures from the former ruling party, the National 
Democratic Party, representing a deep rift in the political coalition formed on 30 June 2013 against 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
Moreover, the coalition of liberal and leftist forces struggling against the rule of the Muslim 
Brotherhood has fragmented over the past months. Many of these forces, such as the liberal 
Egyptians Free Party, the liberal al-Wafd Party and the leftist Socialist Popular Alliance Party, have 
supported the military’s rise and are not assertive in challenging the current restrictive political 
rules. Some political parties, revolutionary youth movements and human rights NGOs persist in 
their struggle for rights, but the balance of power is not in their favour. A rapprochement between 
the Muslim Brotherhood and other secular revolutionary forces cannot be foreseen at this stage. 
Many of these forces today criticise abuses committed against the Muslim Brotherhood. But they 
cannot easily trust the group or the forces of political Islam as a political partner due to ideological 
differences. They blame the political performance of the Muslim Brotherhood over the past three 
years for the current crisis of democratic transition.     
 
                                                     
8
 See El Fegiery, M. (2012) ‘Crunch Time for Egypt’s Civil-Military Relations’. FRIDE policy Brief No.134. Available at: 
http://www.fride.org/descarga/PB_134_Crunch_Time_For_Egypts_Civil_Military_Relations.pdf  
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International and regional dynamics allow the military-backed regime to strengthen its 
manoeuvrability abroad. Regionally, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Kuwait have provided 
generous political and financial support for Egypt after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
These countries have strong political interests in supporting the new regime in Egypt to undermine 
the Muslim Brotherhood presence in their countries and contain any potential unrest in the Gulf. 
The US and EU have been repeatedly critical of Egypt’s clampdown on dissent since the removal of 
Morsi but it does not seem that Western powers will go far in challenging the military-backed 
government – they need a strategic ally in the MENA while they are facing increasing geopolitical 
threats in other regions in the world. This is well understood by Egypt’s military, which has 
recently increased its military cooperation with Russia, playing this card to pressure the US and to 
advance its domestic anti-Western propaganda.
9
 However, the challenge to Western actors at this 
stage is to maintain friendly ties with Egypt without sacrificing principles. The deep economic crisis 
prompts Egypt’s government to continue to ask for external financial support and cooperation with 
international financial institutions. The US and EU can use this leverage to press the Egyptian 
regime for better human rights conditions, drawing also on their influence in the political and 
financial international organisations.    
 
 
Since the fall of Mubarak, the evolution of citizenship has been constrained for certain political, 
ideological and institutional reasons, even as certain forms of dissent and pluralism have been 
tolerated by the successive transitional authorities. Following the ouster of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the systematic decline freedom of expression, pluralism and political participation, as 
well as the increasing cases of unlawful killings, mass arbitrary detention and torture, shape the new 
political landscape in Egypt. The political influence of the military and security apparatus, as well 
as other conservative political forces, has increased. The liberal revolutionary camp suffers from a 
severe crisis. It has become the target of acute repression. Its constituency has retreated and its 
internal divisions have deepened. It will take time for revolutionary forces to establish their place 
again in the political regime. The formal improvements offered by the 2014 constitution are 
meaningless as long as the ruling elite continues its exclusionary and repressive approach towards 
dissenters. The low participation of youth in the referendum signifies that more young people are 
disillusioned with the political process and the increasing labour strikes across Egypt show the 
inability of the government to address pressing socio-economic needs. The current popularity of the 
military will not last without making significant improvements in the hard living conditions of the 
majority of Egyptians. The intractable economic crisis and the increasing societal divides and the 
continuing threats of militant groups create immense challenges to the upcoming executive and 
legislature and most likely undermine their ability to deliver. It would be difficult for the political 
regime to effectively address these challenges without an inclusive national reconciliation process 
that puts Egypt’s transition towards democracy on the right track.            
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